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We find that in 1995 and 1997 the crisis did not spread in a truly random way. The cross-
country variation in the severity of the crisis was largely determined by three fundamentals: the
strength of the banking system, the real appreciation, and the international liquidity of the country.
We also find that the rule that links fundamentals to the crisis severity has been the same in both the







In the aftermath of the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997 Thailand crisis therewas widespread
contagion to several emerging markets. Did these crises spread in a purely random fashion.
or is there a set of fundamentals that helps to explain the spread of each crisis? If the latter
is true, did the contagion follow the same pattern in both episodes,or was each of a different
nature? The answers to these questions are important from both a theoreticalas well as a
practical standpoint. Theoretically, they might help us to better understand the nature of
crises and to discriminate among balance of payments crises models. Practicallythey might
help us to predict future crises, or at least help us to identify countries that will not suffer
an attack during turbulent times.
In this paper we will address these issues by considering the followingquestions. Given
the knowledge that a crisis will erupt at a given date in the near future, is itpossible to
predict which countries will experience an attack? Furthermore, is it possible to determine
the relative severity of the crisis across emerging markets? Finally, is the rule thatexplains
the cross-country variation in the severity of the Tequila crisis also applicable to the Asian
crisis? It should be noted, however, that we will not attempt to determine thetiming of a
crisis in this paper.
We find that the Tequila and Asian crises did not spread acrossemerging markets in a
purely random way. Rather, we find that the cross-country variation in the severity of crises
can be largely explained by fundamentals, albeit in a nonlinear fashion. We also find that
the rule relating fundamentals to crisis severity is the same in both theTequila and Asian
crises. Therefore, had a rule been estimated using data from the Tequila crisis, it would have
been possible to reasonably predict the spread of the Asian crisis using data available in late
1996 or early 1997.
The underlying idea of our analysis is as follows. Since the short positions involved ina
currency attack entail significant costs, an individual money manager will attack a country
only if she expects other money managers to also attack that country, and anticipates that
the country will respond with a sizeable depreciation. The eruption of a crisis ina certain
2country indicates to each investor that other investors will attack vulnerable countries in
the near future. Although investors do not communicateamong themselves they do not
attack countries randomly. They instead use a common set of fundamentals anda stable
filtering rule to predict which countries are most likely to respond with sizable depreciations
and then concentrate their attacks on those countries. As we will explain in Section 2.
these are countries with low international reserves relative to liquid liabilities and with weak
fundamentals, i.e. a severe real appreciation and a banking system laden with bad loans.
We measure these fundamentals with a set of indices that can be constructed before the
onset of a crisis. We then classify country-years as vulnerable or non-vulnerable, depending
on whether or not they have high international liquidity and strong fundamentals. We
consider the Tequila and Asian crises, and the emerging markets that have had free and
developed financial markets during the 1990s.
We find that within the group of vulnerable cases, the crisis index is increasing in the
preceding lending boom and real appreciation. Furthermore, we find that the same model
that explains the spread of the crisis in 1995 also explains the cross-country variation in
the 1997 crisis. This finding helps explain why in 1995 the hardest hit countries were Latin
American, while in 1997 South East Asian countries suffered the most. Prior to the Tequila
crises, Latin American countries, on average, had experienced bigger lending booms and
more severe real appreciations than South East Asian countries. Interestingly, during the
period preceding the Asian crisis the larger lending booms were experienced by South East
Asian countries.
We perform several tests to ensure that our results are robust to changes in the def-
initions of the variables. The same results hold for different groupings of vulnerable and
non-vulnerable country-years, and also for different periods over which the crisis index is
measured. Furthermore, the results are robust to the elimination of outliers. 1vVe also in-
clude other variables that have been associated with the occurrence of crises. These variables
are government consumption, capital inflows and the current account deficit. We find that
there is no change in either the point estimates or the significance levels of the three funda-
3mentals we have considered when we add these variables. Furthermore, estimated coefficients
corresponding to the extra variables are not significantly different from zero.
There is a growing literature on the empirical evidence oncurrency crises, which is
surveyed in Lizondo, Kamisky and Reinhart (1998). There are two groups ofpapers that are
closely related to ours. One group concentrates on the predictability of currency crises, the
second group investigates contagion across markets. Two approaches have beenproposed
to predict crises. One, which might be termed the "signals approach," has been introduced
by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). They select some macroeconomic series that behave
abnormally during periods prior to a crisis. They then produce a warning system based on
signals issued by those variables, and assess the individual and combined ability of these
variables to predict crises. The other approach has been developed by Frankel and Rose
(1996) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995). These authors compare the evolution of
several variables in tranquil times and in crises times. They then estimate the k-step ahead
probability of a crisis using multivariate logit and probit models. Berg and Patillo (1998)
evaluate the out-of-sample performance of these approaches. Ourpaper differs from these
papers in that we condition on the occurrence of a widespread crisis, and concentrate in
explaining the cross-country variation of the severity of the crisis during 1995 and 1997.
Like this paper, the second group of papers concentrates on the determinants ofcontagion.
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996a) tried to explain the spread of the Tequila crisis. Corsetti.
Pesenti and Roubini (1998), and Furman and Stiglitz (1998) try to explain thespread of
the Asian crisis. Glick and Rose (1998) find that countries with important trade linksto
the country that first experienced a crisis are more likely to experience a crisis themselves.
Their approach differs from ours in that they condition both on the timing and the coimtry
that was first hit by the crisis, while we condition only on the timing. Bothpapers should
be considered as complementary since in all likelihood the spread of crises is determinedby
trade links, as well as by the macroeconomic fundamentals we consider.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the conceptual framework
and a simple model. In section 3 we present the empirics. Section 4 contains the conclusions.
4Lastly, the appendix describes how the indices were constructed.
2 Conceptual Framework
In order to determine which countries are most likely to suffer a speculative attack during
a generalized crisis, we will consider the thought processes of risk neutral money managers
and government officials across emerging markets. Since the short positions involved in a
currency attack entail significant interest rate costs, an individual money manager will attack
a country oniy if (i) she expects that other money managers will also attack that country;
and (ii) she expects that the country in question will respond with a sizable depreciation.
In order for the first condition to be satisfied, it is necessary thatmoney managers
coordinate with each other in selecting which currencies should be attacked and on the
timing of the attack itself. Since not all money managers can communicate with each other,
a coordinating device is needed. In this respect, the eruption of a crisis in some emerging
market acts (or reflects) the signal emitted by a coordinating device. This signal indicates
to money managers that others might attack certain currencies in the near future. Although
money managers cannot communicate among themselves, they will concentrate their attacks
on currencies that are expected to react with a sizable depreciation in response to a capital
outflow.
A country might respond to an attack by simply running down reserves, by increasing
its interest rate, or by depreciating. The first option may be the least politically costly, but
it is available only to governments with plenty of reserves to cover their liquid liabilities.
Thus, it is not an option open to the majority of countries as their short run liabilities far
exceed their reserves. In this case governments are faced with a difficult choice between two
unpleasant alternatives. Increasing the interest rate makes speculation against the currency
more expensive, and it can help close the external gap by reducing absorption. Yet the effects
come at the cost of a recession. In emerging markets, the health of the banking system is
a very important determinant of the effect that increasing interest rates will have on the
5economy. When the banking system has a large share of bad loans, a given interest rate
increase is more likely to induce a big recession or even a meltdown of the paymentssystem.
Thus, money managers know that if the banking system is weak, it is not likely that the
government will respond to an attack with an interest rate hike.
In these circumstances, i.e., low reserves and weak banks, a government will be forced to
close the external gap through a depreciation. What is the extent of the depreciation the
government will have to engineer in order to close a given external gap? The greater the real
appreciation has been during the previous few years, the more likely it is that firms in the
tradable sector have shifted to the non-tradable sector, and therefore the lower theresponse
of tradeables to a real depreciation, and the greater the nominal depreciationnecessary to
close the external gap.
In summary, when a currency crisis erupts in an emerging market,money managers
will expect others to attack those countries that are most likely to respond with a sizable
depreciation. Thus, the crisis is not likely to spread to countries with either (1) high reserves,
or (2) with low reserves, but with strong banks or no severe real appreciation. In contrast, the
crisis is likely to reach countries with low reserves, weak banks and a severe real appreciation.
2.1 A Minimal Model
In order to make our ideas more concrete we present a very stylized model. The objective is
simply to formalize the mechanisms through which the concurrence of a weak banking system,
a severe real appreciation and low international liquidity makes it highly likely that a crisis
will spread to a certain country. The model is static, and focuses on the interaction between
investors' devaluation expectations and the government's management of the externalgap in
the very short run. It disregards the intertemporal aspects of both individual and government
behavior. Such aspects are the focus of intertemporal models of balance of payments crises
with multiple equilibria, such as those developed by: Calvo (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1996).
Obstfeld (1995), and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b).
Consider a small open economy where there are many identical small investors who
6initially hold an aggregate stock M of deposits denominated in domesticcurrency that pay
an interest rate r. The sequence of events goes as follows. First, each investor chooses
the stock of domestic deposits she wishes to hold and the amount she wishesto convert
into foreign currency. Then the government decides whether torespond by running down
reserves, by increasing unemp1oyment or by depreciating the currency. Finally, investors
cash their deposits plus the interest accrued.
Since the world interest rate is r, a risk neutral investor will hold domesticdeposits as
long as ￿ 1 + r*, where the initial exchange rate is 1 and ir is the devaluation rate
expected by investor j.Thatis, investor jwillbe willing to hold domestic deposits only if
the devaluation rate she expects is no greater than the threshold
r —
(1) 1+r
To simplify the exposition we assume that each investor can either holda stock in or 0






In a symmetric equilibrium all investors derive the same conclusions from thesignals they
receive. Thus, the change in aggregate deposits LM' is equal to either —Mor 0, where M
denotes the aggregate initial stock of deposits.
When computing the expected rate of depreciation investors take into account theprob-
lem faced by the government, to which we turn next. The homegovernment has an initial
stock R of international reserves. Taking as given Md, the government chooses thechange
in reserves R, the depreciation rate ir, and the unemployment rateu, in order to minimize
the following loss function
mm[ir+cui] (3) ITu
subject to the balance of payments equation (where CA is the current account)
Md= —CA(7r,u) (4) 1+71
7and subject to:
AR> —R, rr >0, u E [0,iL(bl)]ii'(bl) < 0 (5)
The loss function (3)saysthat the government dislikes inflation and unemployment, but
does not care about international reserves (i.e., there is no immediate political cost associated
with depletion of reserves). The parameter c captures how sensitive thegovernment is to
recessions. The upper bound on unemployment Ti(bl) in (5) captures the idea that it is
virtually impossible to increase unemployment (and interest rates) beyond a certain point
without causing generalized bankruptcies and a meltdown of the payments system. We have
made this upper bound decreasing in the share of bad loans in the banks' portfolios (bi).
The higher this share, the more vulnerable the banks are to an increase in unemployment.
In the very short-run the government can improve the current account byincreasing
unemployment or, since prices are predetermined in the short run, by engineering a nominal
depreciation. We will represent the current account in a linear way. This does some minor
violence to the standard formulation, but greatly simplifies the computations that follow.
CA =O(rer)+ u(bl) —H(rer),9' > 0, H' <0 (6)
The term —H(rer) captures the negative effects of past real appreciation on today's current
account. For instance, it measures today's service on the debt associated with past current
account deficits. The coefficient O(rer) indicates how effective a nominal devaluation is in
improving the current account. It may proxy for the degree of wage stickiness in the short
run. or for the slope of the transformation curve between tradeables and non-tradeables:
the greater 9, the less concave the transformation curve. The more appreciated the real
exchange rate has been, the lower 9 (9' > 0). This is because a larger share of producers have
shifted from the tradable to the nontradable sector, and therefore the less a real depreciation
will increase the production of tradables in the short run. We will assume throughout that
parameters satisfy￿1.
In a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium the government takes AMd as given
and chooses (AR, 7r,u)in order to maximize (3) subject to (4) and (5); all investors follow
strategy (2); and the actual and expected devaluation rates are equal: ir =
8Consider the government's problem. There are three cases, dependingon the size of
reserves. First, if international reserves are sufficient to cover any potential capital outflow
plus the current account deficit, the government will find it optimal to close the external
gap by running down reserves. That is, for any withdrawal policy of investors i.M(ire), the
government's best response is:




When reserves are in an intermediate range, the government's policy depends on expectations.
That is:
•If H(rer)R <M+ H(rer) and Ire <ir, then zR*, lr*, and u are given by (7).











Lastly, when reserves are very low(R<H),regardless of the value of z.Md, the gov-
ernment will set R* =—Rand close the external gap by setting the depreciation and
unemployment rates equal to (9) and (10).
The intuition is as follows. The government prefers to close the externalgap by running
down its reserves. However, once reserves are depleted the gap must be closed by either a
9depreciation or by inducing a recession. If the external gap (lvi + H(rer)) is notvery large
relative to the maximum feasible unemployment (n), then thegovernment will trade-off the
costs and benefits of unemployment and devaluation as measured by c and 9. The optimal
choices of unemployment and devaluation are given by the first row of (9) and (10). However.
as the external gap increases beyond a certain threshold, the government will be forced to
close the gap exclusively through further depreciation, as shown in the second row of(9).
We find the symmetric rational expectations equilibria by combining the investors with-
drawal policy (2) and the government's strategy (8)-(10). There are three cases
Case 1. 7r*(_M)t. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium
Ajdo and *(0)
Case 2.E [7r'(0), 7r*(_M)). There are two symmetric equilibria
=0and 7r*(0)
=—A/Iand *(M)
Case 3.<ir(0). There is a unique symmetric equilibrium
zMd_M and =7r*(_M)
In case 1 an attack never occurs. This is the situation where reserves are highor fun-
damentals are strong. When R ￿ M, the government will respond toany zM' by running
down reserves and setting r =0.Knowing this, investors set /Md =0regardless of funda-
mentals. When fundamentals are strong (i.e., there are neithermany bad loans nor severe
real appreciation) the devaluation needed to close the externalgap is smaller than .Thus,
investors have no reason to withdraw their deposits.
Cases 2 and 3 occur when reserves are low and fundamentals are weak. In case 2 there
are multiple equilibria. In the crisis equilibrium investors believe that the devaluation will
be greater than and consequently withdraw their deposits. As a result the devaluation is
10indeed greater than .Inthe no-attack equilibrium investors believe the opposite, and do
not withdraw their deposits. Thus, depreciation is no greater than .Incase 3 fundamentals
are so weak that the government will have to depreciate more than regardless of investors'
expectations.
In order to link the model with the discussion at the beginning of this section,suppose
that a certain coordinating device emits a signal that indicates to investors that the other
investors will withdraw their deposits from countries that belong to case 2. In this situation
countries that belong to case 1 will not suffer attack. In countries that belong to case
2 the signal will turn investors into pessimists, leading them to withdraw their deposits.
Furthermore, within the case 2 countries, those with weaker fundamentals will experience
greater depreciation. One could also consider the eruption of a crisis in a certain country as
the coordinating device. This country should be the first to shift from case 2 to case 3.
In order to give empirical content to the model consider two countries: S' and 'W.
Country 'S' has sufficiently high reserves or has neither a large share of bad loans nor a
severe appreciation. Clearly, country 'S' corresponds to case 1. Therefore, it will not suffer
an attack. Country W' has low reserves, a high share of bad loans and a severe real
appreciation. This country clearly corresponds to either case 2 or 3. Recall that the relative
efficiency of a devaluation in reducing the external gap is decreasing in the extent of real
appreciation O'(rer)> 0,and that the upper bound on unemployment is decreasing in the
share of bad loans u'(bl) <0.Therefore, country 'W' will not be able to close the external
gap by simply running down reserves because the current account deficit H(rer) is likely
to be larger than reserves. Furthermore, since country vV' has a low 0, it is clear from the
first row in (9) that it is more efficient to close the gap by increasing unemployment than
by depreciating. However, since the share of bad loans is high, country W' has a very low
ii(bl). Therefore, the brunt of the adjustment will have to come from a huge depreciation.
It is in this situation, of low reserves and weak fundamentals, that an attack and excessive
depreciation take place.
113 Empirics
The key point of the previous section is that crises do not spread in apurely random way
across emerging markets. Instead, investors concentrate their attacks in countries thatare
very likely to respond with an excessive depreciation. These countries are the ones with very
low reserves relative to liquid liabilities, weak banking systems and asevere real exchange
rate appreciation. There are several ways to measure these three concepts and thus the
severity of a crisis. In this paper, we have chosen to proxy these variables with indices that
are available in data sources. such as the International Financial Statistics, where one might
be confident that the same definitions have been applied to all countries. Note that the
data has to be available on a timely basis if this exercise is to haveany connection with
the decision rules used by money managers. In the end, we would like the rulewe derive
to apply to future currency crises in emerging markets. Therefore, the formulas used to
construct the proxies for the variables we are interested in will be as simple as possible.By
interacting several variables in a non-linear way, we could produce indices that eliminate
nasty" observations and ensure that we could explain a specific episode fairly well. The
drawback to this approach is that the rule so derived might not explain other crises.
The appendix contains a detailed explanation of how the indices are constructed. Here
we simply present a description of these indices. We start with the measurement of the
crisis. The crisis indices we consider are weighted averages of the loss in reserves and the
depreciation against the US Dollar. The initial point is the month before the onset of the
crisis (November 1994, or May 1997). Then, we vary the terminal month over a period of six
months starting in January 1995 or July 1997. The weights given to the loss inreserves and
the devaluation are country-specific, and are inversely related to the relative variance of each
series. The rationale for measuring the crisis in this way is that authorities willtypically
respond to an attack by running down reserves, depreciating and increasing interest rates.
We do not include interest rate changes in the index because there is no data for all the
countries we consider
Ideally, one should measure the weakness of the banking system with the "true" share
12of bad loans. Unfortunately, this information is available neitheron a timely basis nor in
data sources that ensure cross-country comparability. Forinstance, suppose that country
"a' has a smaller "true" bad-to-total loans ratio thancountry "b", but "a" has adopted
US GAAP accounting rules, while country "b" has not. In thiscase, it is very likely that
"b' might report a smaller bad loans ratio because it only classifies the debtservice that
is delinquent as a bad loan. In contrast, country "a" will consider the entire stockof the
delinquent debt as a bad loan. A second problem that arises is misreporting, or the so-called
"evergreen accounts problem." Banks (and often regulators) have incentives to disguise the
fact that there are non-performing loans. Hence, banks willsimply continue to lend to
the non-performing accounts an amount equivalent to thepayments they were supposed to
make. This cultivation of evergreen accounts cango on for a long period of time without
market participants noticing the problem. This brings us to the thirdproblem, namely that
information on non-performing loans is not available on a timely basis. Forinstance, money
managers that were looking at the Mexican bad loans ratio in 1994 saw acceptable numbers.
The recognition of a sizable share of bad loans did not come until after the crisis haderupted.
For these reasons, we proxy the weakness of the bankingsystem with a lending boom
index. This variable is available on a timely basis and is comparableacross countries. We
measure the "lending boom" as the real percent increase in loans provided by the banking
system to the private sector and state-owned enterprises over the previous fouryears. 'We
should expect that the greater the increase of loans provided by thebanking system during
a short span of time, the greater the share of bad loans in the subsequent period would be.
There are several reasons why this is true. First, banks have limitedcapacity to evaluate
projects. Second, regulatory agencies have limited monitoring capacity and resources. Last,
there exists a limited supply of "good" projects with high expected returns relativeto their
variance. Note that even if a country is experiencing a sharp increase inoutput, we should
expect a lending boom to weaken the banking system. This is because at least one of the
three mechanisms described above will be operative.
We measure the real exchange rate as a weightedaverage of the bilateral real exchange
13rates of a given country with respect to the US dollar, the Mark, and the Yen. Theweights
add up to one and are proportional to the shares of bilateral trade in thegiven country
with the US, the European Union, and Japan, respectively. Our real depreciation indexis
the percentage change in this index over the fouryears prior to the onset of the crisis. i.e..
December 1994 relative to December 1990, and December 1996 relative to December1992.
The problems associated with measuring real depreciation in thisway are well understood.
so we will not discuss them here.
We proxy the government's liquidity by the ratio of M2 to reserves in the monthpreceding
the onset of the crisis (November 1994 or May 1997). If the central bank is notwilling to let
the exchange rate depreciate, it must be prepared to cover all the liabilities of thebanking
system with reserves. Thus, it is M2, and not simply the monetary base, that must be the
relevant proxy of the central bank's contingent liabilities. During a crisis banksare likely
to experience runs. If the central bank does not act as a lender of last resort,generalized
bankruptcies are likely to follow. Since, in most circumstances, authorities will not find it
optimal to allow the economy to experience generalized bankruptcies, the central bank will
have to be prepared to exchange the amount withdrawn by depositors for foreignexchange.
Our sample consists of the developing countries listed in the "Emerging St.ock Markets
Factbook" of the International Finance Corporation, with the exception of (1) Greece and
Portugal, as they belong to the European Union and are not developing countries; (2) China.
because there is no free convertibility; and (3) Nigeria, because there is no data availabil-
ity. Thus, our sample consists of Hong Kong and 22 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru,
The Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela,
and Zimbabwe. Note that these countries have had free convertibility, and financial markets
in which foreigners could freely invest during the 1990s.
We consider the two generalized emerging market currency crises that have occurred in
the 1990s. Previous crises, like the debt crisis of the early 1980s, were of a different nature
and are not considered. In those cases, financial markets in emerging markets were notyet
14liberalized, and the majority of capital inflows took the form of loans togovernments by
large foreign banks or official agencies. The currency crises of the 1990s have happened
under different conditions and thus, we should expect different mechanisms to beat work.
3.1 The Benchmark Regression
As was mentioned earlier, our goal is not to determine when a crisis willoccur, but rather
in the event that it does occur, how it will spread across emerging markets. In otherwords.
our objective is to determine the cross-country variation in the crisis index conditioning only
on the timing of the crisis, not on the country in which it first hits. Furthermore, the same
rule should determine the cross-country variation of the crisis indices in the 1994 and 1997
crises.
As was discussed in the previous section, the onset of a crisis occurs whena coordinating
device emits a signal. This signal will alert each investor to a coming attackon some emerging
market by all other investors. The countries that are most likely torespond to an attack
with an excessive depreciation will be the targets of an attack. Theseare countries with
weak fundamentals arid low reserves. Furthermore, within this subset ofcountries, the more
severe the lending booms and the real appreciation, the more resources will be allocated
to attack it and the greater the crisis index. In contrast, countries withhigh reserves or
strong fundamentals will not be targeted by investors. As a result, we should notexpect
that variations in the explanatory variables should affect the crisis indices in this subsetof
countries.
We implement these ideas empirically by classifying observations into fourgroups: high
and low reserves cases, and strong and weak fundamentals cases. In our benchmarkregression
we classify most country-years as being those with low reserves and weak fundamentals.
Then, we consider more and less stringent definitions of the vulnerable region, andsee how
robust our results are to such changes.
In the benchmark case a country-year has high reserves (D' =1)if its M2/Reserves ratio
is below 1.8. A country-year has strong fundamentals (Dsf1) if its lending boom is below
150% and its real exchange rate appreciation is lower than 5%. Thegroup with high reserves
includes 7 country-years while the group with strong fundamentals includes 5country-years.
Later on we change the thresholds that define the dummies andanalyze the robustness of
our results.
In the benchmark we stack the 46 observations for the 1994 and 1997crises, and estimate
the following regression using ordinary least squares.
Crisist =c +aiLB + a2RER + c3D. LB+ a4D". RER
+a5Dsf LB + a6D RER + it (11)
where i indexes the country and t indexes time. Below we investigate whether country effects
are present.
The effects of the lending boom and real appreciation in the case of weak fundamentals
and low reserves are captured by a1 and a2, respectively. Theory predicts that when there
is fragility, the crisis will be greater if the lending boom is large (i.e.a >0) and the real
appreciation is high (i.e. a2 <0). The effects of the lending boom and real appreciation for
the case of high reserves are captured by a1+a3anda2+a4, respectively. Meanwhile. in the
case of strong fundamentals, these effects are captured by a1+a5 and a2+a6, respectively.
According to the theory, if there is no fragility (D' =1or D1 =1),neither a greater
lending boom nor a greater appreciation will have any effect on the investors' decision to
attack. Thus, we expect to find that a1+a3 =a2+a4=0,and a1+a5 a2+a50.
For our benchmark we consider the crisis index that corresponds to the four months after
the onset of the crisis. In the Tequila crisis we look at November 94-March 95 and for the
Asian crisis, we consider May 97-September 97. Below we show how the estimateschange
as we vary the crisis index. The estimated regression is
—4.25 +0.26LB —0.12RER2 _0.26Dhr .LB Crzsist=
(4.14) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11)
0.25Dh1T .RER+0.00D LB +0.30D1 .RER+Ejt
(0.36) (0.26) (0.17)
R2 =0.48,R2 =0.40,N =46 (12)
16Newey-West Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors appear in parentheses'. Thesees-
timates agree with the theory presented earlier. First, for countries with weak fundamentals
and low reserves, the coefficients corresponding to the lending boom (ui)andthe real ap-
preciation (cr2)aresignificantly different from zero at the 5% level. The point estimates
indicate that: (i) a one unit increase in the LB index for a country-year with lowreserves
and weak fundamentals leads to a 0.26 unit increase in the crisis index of thatcountry-year
relative to the average of our emerging markets sample; (ii) a one unit increase in the real
appreciation index leads to a 0.12 increase in the crisis index relative to the average. Second.
as expected. neither the LB index nor the RER enter significantly in countries with high
reserves. In these cases, the corresponding point estimates are 1+o3= 0 and a2+Q4
—.37.Furthermore, Wald tests indicate that the hypotheses a1+o30andc2+a4=0 cannot
be rejected (the associated p-values are 0.85 and 0.33, respectively). Similarly, in countries
with strong fundamentals, neither LB nor RER affect the severity of the crisis. The p-values
associated with Wald tests of the hypotheses that a1+a50 and o2+c6=0 are 0.30 and 0.23,
respectively.
Figure 1 plots the actual crisis indexes and the fitted values. As can be seen, with a
few notable exceptions, the fitted values match the actual crisis indices quite well. The
exceptions are: Mexico 94, Indonesia 97, Thailand 94, and Thailand 97.
In summary, the regression results support the idea thatcurrency crises do not spread
in a purely random way. One can predict—with fair confidence—that a crisis will spread
'If we include in the benchmark regression two extra terms with the dummies: a8D and n9D, the
point estimates and signiificance levels of a, and a2 remain unchanged
—4.77+O.26LB,, —O.12RER —O.28D .LB_O.3ODF1T .RER Crzszs =
(4.30)(0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.15)
+0.94D81 .LB—0.10D .RER+8.67DhT +24.47D8f +€
(0.80) (0.60) (5.00) (25.07)
R2 = 0.49, 2=0.38,N = 46
17to countries that are vulnerable. A country is vulnerable to an attack if it has had an
appreciated real exchange rate for the past few years, or if it has experienced a lending
boom, thus increasing the likelihood that its banking system is laden with bad loans. Both
effects point in the direction of a higher expected depreciation, unless thecountry in question
has sufficient international reserves relative to its short-term liabilities. In thiscase, the best
response of the government might be to defend the peg.
A few examples illustrate how the combination of these three fundamentals can helpus
explain some puzzling cases. If we look at Peru, for instance, we see that over the 4 years
prior to the Tequila crisis it had experienced a similar appreciation and a greater lending
boom than Mexico. However, Peru's crisis index was only -2.7, while Mexico's was 79.3.
This can be explained by the fact that Mexico was illiquid, while Peru was not. In fact, in
November 1994, the ratio of M2 to reserves was 1.3 for Peru and 9.3 in Mexico.
3.2 Country Effects
In our sample there are two observations per country, one corresponding to the Tequila crisis
and the other to the Asian crisis. At this point, the question arises as to whether or not
country effects are present. In order to determine the correct specification we consider three
different models: the simple OLS model presented in equation (12), a fixed effects model, and
a random effects model. The simple OLS model assumes that there are no country effects, so
that equation (11) is the correct specification. In contrast, the fixed effects model assumes
that there are country effects and that they are constant through time. Thus, the constant
term c in equation (11) is replaced by 23 terms of the form a0 *D2,where D is a dummy
that equals one if the observation corresponds to country i. Lastly, the random effects
model considers country-specific effects as randomly distributed across countries. Hence, the
estimated model is (11) plus u, where u is a random disturbance corresponding to country
i.
Aswe can see in Table 1, the estimated coefficients of the simple OLS and random effects
models are identical (0.26 and -0.12, respectively). The estimates for the fixed effects model
18have the same signs as the OLS estimates, however, the point estimates are slightly different
(0.32 and -0.22, respectively).
To test the null hypothesis of no country-specific effects against the alternative that there
are country-specific fixed effects we perform an F test. That is, under the null, all coefficients
are equal. The F statistic is
F[22, 17] =
[0.8157—0.4836]/22=1.39
Since the 1% critical value from the F table is 3.1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no fixed effects.
To test the null hypothesis of no country effects against the alternative of random effects,
we perform a Breusch Pagan test. Now the null hypothesis is that the variance of the residuals
u's is zero. The test statistic is LIv1 =0.0659.Under the null, the LvI statistic is distributed
as chi-squared with six degrees of freedom. Since 0.0659 is lower than the 1% critical value,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no random effects.
From the two preceding tests, we conclude that the simple OLS model of equation (11)
is an appropriate specification. Thus, in the remainder of the paper we will use regression
equation (12) as our benchmark.
3.3 Structural Change
At this point in the analysis, a natural question arises as to whether the same model that
explains the spread of the crisis in 1995 also explains the cross country variation in the 1997
crisis, or whether there was, in fact, a structural change. The first column of Table 2 shows
the estimates of the benchmark regression that includes the Tequila and Asian crisis. The
second and third columns show the estimates of regression equation (11) for the 1994 and
1997 crises, respectively. The point estimates for the country-years with weak fundamentals
and low reserves are very similar. The coefficient corresponding to the lending boom (cvi) are
0.26, 0.30, and 0.21, respectively. Those corresponding to the real exchange rate depreciation
(cr2) are -0.12, -0.23, and -0.06, respectively.
19To test the hypothesis that the coefficients in equation (11) are thesame in both periods
we perform a Chow test. The test statistic is





Sincethe critical value at the 1% level is 3.3, we cannot reject the hypothesis thatthe sets
of coefficients are the same in the two periods.
Next, we test whether the two coefficients that interest us most (a1 anda2) are the
same in both periods. To do this, we first add the term as*LB*D97 to equation (11), where
D97 takes the value of one for observations that correspond to the 1997 crisis. Itfollows
that in countries with weak fundamentals and lowreserves, the effect of the lending boom
on the crisis index is a for the 1994 crisis and a1+a8 for the 1997 crisis. Therefore, the
null hypothesis is a80. As can be seen in Column (4) in Table 2, the estimate ofa is
not different from zero at the usual significance levels. Next, we perform thesame test for
the real exchange rate depreciation. Column (5) in Table 2, shows the estimationresults
for equation (11) adding the extra term ag*RER*D97. In thiscase the estimate for a is
significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
3.4 Predicting the Asian Crisis
Suppose a crystal ball had predicted that a crisis would erupt in mid 1997 andsuppose a
money manager had estimated the model of equation (11) using data from the 1994 crisis.
How well would she predict the spread of the crisis across emerging markets? Note thatwe
are not asking "when will the next crisis erupt."
Towards this end, we will construct an out-of-sample predicted crisis indexby substituting
in equation (11): (a) the estimated coefficients of a regression thatuses only data from the
1994 crisis; and (b) the explanatory variables that correspond to the 1997crisis, i.e., the
lending boom and the real depreciation over the period 1992-1996, and the ratio of M2 to
reserves of May 1997. The resulting predicted crises indices are depicted as the dashed line in
Figure 2. The solid line represents the actual crisis indices, while the dotted linesrepresent
20the fitted values of the regression using oniy the data from 1997. Ascan be seen in Figure
2, the predicted crises indices using 1994 data are quite similar to the fitted crises indices
that include 1997 data.
TO measure how well the out-of-sample prediction fits the actual crisis indices of 1997we
regressed the actual crisis indices of 1997 on the predicted out-of-sample crisis indices:
97 Crisis0.65 [out —of
—samplepredicted 97crisis} + u
(0.17)
R2=0.51
The regression coefficient is 0.65, and it is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Thus, we see that, by using the 1994 model, one would not have fared badly in predicting
which countries would have been hard hit in 1997. Of course, there is estimation risk.
3.5 Robustness
Here we analyze whether the results of the benchmark regression equation(12) are robust
to changes in the period over which the crisis index is measured, alternative definitions of
the dummies, and to the elimination of outliers.
3.5.1 The Crisis Index
In order to analyze whether the results are robust to changes in the periodover which the
crisis index is measured, we estimate equation (11) using six crises indices. For allindices,
the starting point is the month preceding the onset of the crisis (i.e. November 1994 for
the Tequila crisis and May 1997 for the Asian crisis). Then, wevary the terminal month
over a period of six months starting in January 1995 or July 1997. As Table 3 shows, in
columns (4) through (6) the point estimates and significance levels are similar to those of
the benchmark regression (column (3)). Moreover, the estimate ofc (that corresponds to
the lending boom) is significantly different from zero at the 5% level in all colunms, and the
point estimates in columns (4)-(6) are very similar to the benchmark estimate of 0.26.
213.5.2 Alternative Definitions of the Dummies
In the benchmark regression, a country-year is classified as having highreserves if. at the
onset of the crisis, its ratio of vi2toreserves is lower than 1.8. According to this crite-
rion, 7caseshad high reserves. Under the benchmark, a country has strong fundamentals
if its lending boom variable is negative and its real appreciation is less than 5%(this yields
4 country-years). The second and third columns of Table 4 show the estimates for differ-
ent thresholds concerning the high reserves dummy, while keeping the strong fundamentals
dummy unchanged. In the second column, the threshold is 1.5 (3 country-years) and in
the third column, it is 2 (10 country-years). Column 4 corresponds to the case in which
fundamentals are strong if the lending boom is less than 20% and the real appreciation is
less than 5% (9 country-years), while in column 5 these thresholds are bothzero (2 cases).
For countries with low reserves and weak fundamentals, the point estimatescorrespond-
ing to the lending boom (cu)andthe real depreciation (a2) are very similar to the benchmark
estimates in all cases. Furthermore, they are all significant at the 5% and 10% level,respec-
tively. The estimates for the remaining parameters are stable. Lastly, the p-values associated
with the Wald tests are greater that 0.10, except in three cases. Since the thresholdswe
have considered vary over wide ranges, we might conclude that the benchmark resultsare
robust to the way in which we define strong fundamentals and highreserves.
3.5.3 Fitting Simpler Equations
We have seen that the benchmark results are robust to the thresholds used to define the
dummies for high reserves and strong fundamentals. Would the results remainunchanged
if we were to disregard these dummies? To address this issue, we estimateequation (11)
eliminating one dummy while leaving the other and then eliminating both. As column 2 of
Table 5 shows, eliminating the strong fundamentals dummy does not haveany important
effect on either the point estimates or on the significance levels. In contrast, ifwe exclude the
high reserves dummy (column 3), the significance of the estimate of a1 is eliminated, and the
adjusted R2 is reduced from 0.40 to 0.11. Surprisingly, if we exclude both dummies (column
224), the lending boom and the real depreciation enter significantly and with the correct signs.
Note, however, that the point estimate of(0.11) is much smaller than the benchmark
estimate (0.26), and additionally, that the adjusted R2 is quite small (0.15).
3.5.4 Outliers
Observations with large residuals or large leverage are likely to exert undue influenceon
the regression results. There are several ways to identify such outliers. One simpleway
is to select the observations with higher than average leverage and larger thanaverage
squared residuals. According to this criterion the outliers are Hungary 97, Mexico 94. and
Philippines 97. There are also statistics to determine which observations are outliers, such
as Cook's distance and Welsch's distance. These statistics are computed by STATA. Using
these criteria, the outliers are the three previously listed plus Mexico 97 and Turkey 94.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (11) by eliminating, one at a time,
the five outliers mentioned above. In all cases, the point estimates ofc are positive and
those of c2arenegative. Furthermore, both are significantly different from zero at the 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
3.6 Additional Determinants of Currency Crises
High govermnent consumption, excessive capital inflows and unsustainable current account
deficits have been identified as important determinants of currency crises in some well-known
episodes. Here, we analyze whether these variables help explain the cross-country variation
in the crisis indices after we have controlled for the lending boom, the real appreciation, and
the reserves adequacy ratio, We measure each concept in two ways: as theaverage ratio
to GDP over the four years prior to the onset of the crisis (either 1990-94 or 1992-96), and
as the real percentage change during the same periods. In each case we interact the extra
variable with the high reserves dummy and the strong fundamentals dummy. The estimated
coefficients are presented in Tables Ta and 7b.
Our regression estimates indicate that in countries with low reserves and weak fundamen-
23tals, government consumption has a positive effect on the crisis index if the lending boom
and real depreciation variables are excluded. As column 1 of Table 7a shows. the estimated
coefficient on government consumption is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
However, if the lending boom and real depreciation variables are included, government con-
sumption ceases to be significant (column 2). We can interpret this finding as saying that
if excessive government consumption leads to a greater crisis, it does so, not directly, but
rather through its effects on the lending boom and the real exchange rate. It is interesting
to note that the point estimates and significance levels of the coefficients corresponding to
the lending boom and real depreciation indices (cr1anda) in column 2 are very similar to
the ones in benchmark equation (12).
Now, we turn our attention to capital inflows. A popular view is that excessive capital
inflows must lead eventually to a currency crisis. This is because in a short span of time
excessive inflows cannot be efficiently channeled to productive projects. Thus, they end up
invested in "white elephant" or "crony" projects. As a result, the economy is not able to
generate, over the medium run, the necessary returns to repay investors. It is at this point
that the economy becomes vulnerable to a crisis. Column 3 of Table 7 presents the estimates
of a regression equation that includes only the capital inflows variable. For countries with
low reserves and weak fundamentals, capital inflows enter positively and significantly at the
10% level. However, if one includes the lending boom, and the real depreciation indices,
capital inflows have no effect on the severity of the crisis (column 4). As before, this finding
suggests that capital inflows do not have an extra effect on the extent of a crisis beyond the
effect they exert on the lending boom and real appreciation.
Next, we consider the ratio of the average current account deficit to GDP. It is frequently
argued that countries cannot run large current account deficits for long periods of time.
This view is related to the Feldstein-Horioka finding. Here, we consider the average current
account over the four years preceding each crisis. Since four years is hardly the long run,
we should not expect to see a positive correlation between the current account variable and
the crises indices. In fact, the point estimates of the current account variable are negative.
24As before, the estimates are significant only when we exclude the lending boom and real
depreciation indices from the regression (see columns 5 and 6).
Finally, Table 7b presents estimation results for the case where the extra variables are
included as the real percentage change over the four years prior to the onset of the crisis
(either 1990-94 or 1992-96). In neither case do the extra variables enter significantly at the
10% level.
4 Conclusions
Our findings suggest that in the recent Tequila and Asian episodescurrency crises did not
spread in a purely random way. Rather, there is a set of fundamentals that helps explain the
cross-country variation of the severity of those crises. We find that crises did not spread to
countries with strong fundamentals or high international reserves. Furthermore, within the
set of vulnerable countries —those with weak fundamentals and low reserves— we find that
the crisis index was increasing in the extent of the lending boom and the severity of the real
appreciation experienced by the country.
Furthermore, we find that the same model that explains the spread of the crisis in 1995
also explains the cross-country variation in the 1997 crisis. This finding helps explain why
in 1995 the hardest hit countries were Latin American, while in 1997 the South East Asian
countries were hit hardest. Prior to the Tequila crisis Latin American countries, onaverage,
had experienced bigger lending booms and more severe real appreciations than South East
Asian countries. Interestingly, the opposite is true for the period preceding the Asian crisis.
Note that our findings do not imply that there is a simple relation between fundamentals
and the timing of a crisis in a given country. The fact that a country is vulnerable does
not imply that it must suffer a crisis in the near future. It only implies that if investors
expectations turn pessimistic, a crisis will ensue because the government will be forced to
close the external gap through a large depreciation, thereby justifying investor's expectations.
To the extent that investors expectations are unpredictable, the timing of a crisis in a
particular country is unpredictable.
255 Data Appendix
Real Exchange Rate Depreciation
Average nominal exchange rates and CPI data were obtained from the IFS CD-ROM
(lines rf and 64, respectively) for all countries except Taiwan and Hong Kong. The weighted
average of the bilateral real exchange rates (which was computed using CPI's) was then
calculated with respect to the yen, the dollar, and the DM to obtain a proxy for the real
exchange rate. These weights total one and are proportional to the relative bilateral trade
shares with Japan, the US, and the EU. Trade shares were computed from the IMF's Direc-
tion of Trade Statistics (1997 Yearbook). Real exchange rate data from JP Morgan was used
for Taiwan and Hong Kong. The real depreciation index is the percentage increase in the
real exchange rate from 1990 to 1994 for the Tequila crisis and 1992 to 1996 for the Asian
crisis.
Lending Boom
First, we obtained the annual real lending of the banking system to the private sector
and state-owned enterprises by subtracting government claims (line 32an) from total domes-
tic credit (line 32), and adjusting for inflation using December CPI's (line 64). We then
computed the Lending Boom index as the percentage change of real lending from 1990 to
1994 for the Tequila crisis and 1992 to 1996 for the Asian crisis.
Reserve Adequacy
Vv'è used the ratio of 1V12 to total reserves minus gold (line iLd) as a proxy for reserve
adequacy. M2 was calculated as the sum of money (line 34) and quasi-money (line 35).
Reserves were converted to national currency using the monthly exchange rate (line rf). The
monthly ratio of November 1994 and June 1997 was used as the index for reserve adequacy
for the two crises respectively. Several countries did not have data updated through June
1997, so the most recent measure was used. For Malaysia, Poland, Taiwan, and Hungary
the relevant measures are as of November 96, November 96, December 96, and September
97, respectively. This should not be a significant problem as the ratios for these countries
are fairly stable over time.
26Crisis Index
The crisis index was calculated as the weighted average of the percentage depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate with respect to the US dollar and the percentage decrease in
reserves. For the Tequila crisis we computed the crisis index using November 1994 as the
initial point and a particular month in 1995 as the end point. For the Asian crisis, we used
May 1997 as the initial point. The weights were determined as follows: for each variable we
calculated the precision (the inverse of the variance) of the monthly series over the period
1985-1995. Then for each country we computed the weight of each variable as its precision
over the sum of precisions. For several countries, reserve data was not available on a monthly
basis for the entire 10-year period and was therefore calculated with the data available from
the IFS. Precision for Hong Kong was calculated from mixed frequency data (quarterly for
several years and then monthly). Precision for Hungary begins in September 1989. Taiwan is
measured from 1994 through 1997. For Poland, precision calculation begins in 1990 when the
currency stabilized after the transition to a free market economy. Also, it should be noted
that IFS was missing recent reserve information for many years. Reserves were obtained
using a variety of sources including The Economist, Bloomberg, and the Central Banks of
various countries. In addition, Datastream was used to extend exchange rates. All of these
data sources were checked with the previous data from the IFS.
Current Account
Current account data is available from IFS CD-ROM (line 78a1). Average share of
current account to GDP between 1990-1994 and 1992-1996 were used for the two crises.
Capital Inflows
Capital inflows were calculated as the sum of capital account, financial account and Net
errors and Omissions (line78bc, line 78bj, and line 78ca from IFS CD-ROM). Average shares
of Capital inflows to GDP between 1990-1994 and 1992-1996 were used for the two crises.
Unfortunately, this data was not available for Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Government Consumption
Government consumption data is available from IFS CD-ROM (line 91f). Average shares
27of capital inflows to GDP between 1990-1994 and1992-1996 were used for the two crises.
No data was available for Argentina.
Taiwan
Most of the data for Taiwan comes from Financial Statistics,Republic of China with the
following exceptions: the real exchange rates data comes from JP Morgan, andtotal reserve
minus gold data comes from FAME international database.
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Note.' the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;
Newey- West Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in italics
31Table 2: Structural Changes
SUMMARY STA TIS TICS
R2
ADJ R2
Note. the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;-
Newey-West Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in italics




























































































Interval usedto calculatecrisis index
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
and SummaryIndependent94Nov-Jan Nov-Feb Nov-MarNov-AprNov-MayNov-Jun Statistic Variable 97May-JulyMay-AugMay-S eptMay-OctMay-NovMay-Dec
cxi LB 0.13 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.28
0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09
-0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.13 -0.1 -0.03
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12
-0.14 -0.18 -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.33
0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.09
-0.25 -0.35 -0.25 -0.08 0.12 0.01
0.24 0.24 0.36 0.33 0.36 0.5
-0.1 0.09 0 0.06 0.17 0.26
0.13 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.29 033
0.17 0.16 0.3 0.23 0.26 0.08
0.12 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.18
-2.74 -2.73 -4.25 -2.39 -0.06 2.98
3 2.92 4.14 3.69 3.48 4.52
0.33 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.27
0.23 0.33 0.4 0.36 0.34 0.16
0.27 0.11 0.85 0.19 0.08 0.03
0.25 0.14 0.33 0.53 0.96 0.96

















Note:the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;
Newey- West Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in italics.
33Table 4 Alternative Definition of the Dummies
Estimated Benchmark -2 -3 -4 -5
Coefficient RA<1.8RA<1.5RA<2.0RA<l.8RA<l.8
and Summa,yIndependent RER > -5%RER > -5%RER > -5%RER > -5%RER> 0%
Statistic Variable LB < 0%LB < 0%LB < 0%LB <20%LB< 0%
LB 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
0.1/ 0.1/ 0.1/ 0./I 0.11
a2 RER -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06
LB*Dhr -0.26 -0.2 -0.27 -0.26 -0.26
0./I 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
a4 RER*D/hr -0.25 0.82 -0.32 -0.25 -0.23
0.36 0.59 0.2 0.41 0.44
LB*DASf 0 -0.2 0.02 -0.03 -0.71
0.26 0.35 0.26 0.13 014
a6 RER*Drsf 0.3 0,23 0.32 0.29 0.07
0.17 0.16 0.17 0.2 0.22
a7 CONSTANT -4.25 -4.21 -4 -4.89 -4.33
4/4 4.2 3.96 4.2 3.91
SUMMARY STA TIS TICS
R2 0.48 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.47
ADJR2 0.4 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.42
ADDEND UM WALD TEST
NULL HYPOTHESIS
xl+a3=0 0.85 0.26 0.63 0.93 0.94
a2+a4=0 0.33 0.25 0.03 0.36 0.45
al+a5=0 0.3 0.87 0.26 0.12 0.06
a2+a6=0 0,23 0.42 0.2 0.36 0.79
Note: the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;





Note:the dependent variable is the Crisis Index,


















0.26 0.25 0.11 0.11
0.11 0.1 0.07 0.06
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-4.25 -3.31 2.19 0.91










and SummaryIndpendent Hungary Mexico Turkey MexicoPhilippines
Statistic Variable 94 94 94 97 97
aI LB 0.3 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.26
0.12 0.05 0.11 0.1] 0.1/
a2 RER -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
a3 LB*Dhr -0.3 -0.15 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26
0/1 004 0.11 0.1/ 0.1]
a4 RER*DAhr -0.43 -0.03 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
0.4 0.22 0.36 0.36 0.36
LB*Dsf -0.06 0.11 0.01 0.01 0
0.26 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26
a6 RER*Dsf 0.32 0.14 0.24 0.32 0.3
0.17 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.17
CONSTANT -6.41 -0.35 -4.22 -4.22 -4.25
4.19 1.74 4 4 3.99
SLi4MARYSTATISTICS
R2 0.53 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.48
ADJR2 0.46 0.24 0.4 0.4 0.4
ADDENDUM. WALDTESTS
NULL FIYPOTHESIS
cxl+cx3=0 0.98 0.42 0.85 0.85 0.85
a2+a4=0 0.21 0.6 0.31 0.31 0.31
al+a5=0 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.28
a2+a6=0 0.12 0.56 0.4 0.16 0.23
Note:the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;
Newey- West Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in italics.






Note: the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;




Variables addedas theaverage ratio toGDP
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0.06 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.32 0.22
0.14 0.49 0.18 0.53 0.24 0.54
0.08 0.36 0.12 0.39 0.18 0.42Table 7b: Additional Determinants of Crises
Note: the dependent variable is the Crisis Index;














































6.47 -2.66 7.94 -3.93 -4.57
2.41 3.21 2.74 4.31 4
36.86 20.81 -0.2 -0.41 -0.4
31.77 23.73 0.53 0.23 0.47
-41.05 -27.91 1.66 2.08 -2.26
32.05 42.29 4.07 1.59 2.26
34.54 55.88 8.52 11.54 -5.1
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Figure 1: Actual and Fitted Crises Indices
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Figure 2: 1997 Crises
? .t, / 4, 7 7 J /// I
Actual Index — —Out-of-sample prediction —X— in-of-sample prediction
40
I'
'I
'I
V'I'I
V